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not
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stock, Mr. Smith was required to return the stock if and when his
employment relationship terminated.
In the trial

court

and

the Court

of Appeals, Mr. Smith

contended a consulting agreement, entered into in early 1984, was
wrongfully terminated

and the 11,945 shares properly fit within

the measure of damages to which he was entitled for the wrongful
termination.

In contrast, Rocky Mountain

the consulting

Helicopters contended

agreement was not wrongfully terminated

and even

if it were wrongfully terminated, the 11,945 shares of stock did
not fit within the appropriate measure of damages.
B.
Following

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

trial, the trial court concluded

the consulting

agreement had, in fact, been wrongfully terminated as it related
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the consulting agreement and, furthermore, the agreement had no
provision providing for a minimum number of workdays.1
With respect to the stock, the trial court ordered return of

-1-. The Court of Appeals likewise noted "the nature of the
work Smith agreed to perform under the contract did not require a
set amount of time each week or month...."
(See Opinion P. 5 ) .
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The

Appeals'

only

to

2).
Mr.

Smith's
In

the

3.

Stock Certificate

No. 103 in the amount of 11,945

shares was issued to Richard Smith on or about December 7, 1982.
(R. 304)
4.

The terms and conditions of the issuance, permitted

Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. to recall the stock represented
by Certificate No. 103, at no cost, if: (1) Smith resigned as a
director and employee of the company;
for reasonable cause;

(2) Smith was terminated

(3) Smith died;

or (4) Smith left the

company for other reasons; unless prior to one of those events
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. was sold or participated
successful public or private offering of its common stock.
the company was sold or participated

in a
If

in a successful public or

private offering of its common stock then the option to call the
stock would expire.
5.

(R. 305)

At the time the disputed shares were issued, Mr. Smith

was fully aware of the terms and conditions governing

the

issuance of the stock including the right to recall the stock....
(R. 305)
6.

During

1983, Mr. Smith

negotiated

with

Offshore

Logistics for the sale of Rocky Mountain Helicopters and in
October

of 1983, a letter of intent for the sale of Rocky

Mountain Helicopters to Offshore Logistics was negotiated.

The

transaction was accepted and ratified by Rocky Mountain's Board
of Directors at a meeting on November 15, 1983.

A draft of a

sale contract for the transfer of Rocky Mountain Helicopters'
assets was prepared.

However, the sale was never consummated, in
6

that the final terms of the agreement were never agreed to by the
parties.

Offshore Logistics Inc. reduced and changed its initial

offer to purchase prior to finalization of the drafted sales
contract.
7.

(R. 305)
Towards the latter part of 1983, and as a result of

differences regarding corporate policy, a rift arose between Mr.
Burr and Mr. Smith.
8.

(R. 306)

As a result of the major differences between Mr. Smith

and Mr. Burr, Mr. Smith's position with the company was changed
by Mr. Burr in a handwritten letter to Mr. Smith.
stated:

The letter

"If the present sale proposal fails you will be asked to

return your

shares of stock December 31, 1983."

The sale

proposal to which reference is made in the handwritten letter is
that sale proposal to Offshore Logistics.
9.

(R.306)

In February of 1984, Mr. Burr and Mr. Smith agreed upon

the terms of a one-year consulting agreement, as set forth in a
memo drafted by Smith and signed by both.

Under the agreement,

Smith resigned as Vice President of Finance to pursue other
commitments.

However, he agreed to act as a consultant with the

principal assignment of continuing efforts either to sell the
company or raise equity capital. The consulting

agreement

provided Smith would receive $275.00 per day or $137.50 per halfday for

time

spent rendering

services to the company.

In

addition the agreement stated Rocky Mountain and Smith would
mutually target 8 (eight) days a month, based upon Smith's

7

availability and the work requirements of Rocky Mountain.
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(R. 308, Opinion
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wrongfully terminated as it related
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facts,

as

found

by t h e

trial

by Mr. Smith on a p p e a l ,

nor were any of

found,

Appeals,

by t h e

upon i n s u f f i c i e n c y

Court
of

of
the

evidence.

to

be
(See
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2 T h i s c o u r t should n o t e t h e t r i a l c o u r t made no f i n d i n g
t h a t t h e e s c r o w a g r e e m e n t was t e r m i n a t e d , w r o n g f u l l y o r
otherwise.
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VI,

ARGUMENT

A,

POINT I

THE COURT OF APPEALS RELIANCE ON FLEMING V,
FLEMING-FELT IS UNJUSTIFIED IN LIGHT OF THE
TRIAL COURTfS FINDINGS OF FACT.
At page five of its opinion, the Court of Appeals, relying
upon Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Company, 7 Utah 2d 293, 323 P.2d
712, 716 (1958), concludes "A substantial breach by one party,
which prevents the other party from performing, excuses the other
party from further performance and allows him to recover damages
for the breach."
The Fl em ing decision

sets forth good

law.

Professor

Williston has stated:
The principle that prevention by one party
excuses performance by the other, both of a
condition and of a promise, may be laid down
broadly for all cases. This statement is
frequently quoted. The condition is excused
because the promisor has caused the nonperformance of the condition.
Williston on Contracts, Third Ed. Section 677, at 231.

In other

words, the condition or promise is excused because the breach
prevented performance of the condition or promise.
In Fleming, "the finding was made that notwithstanding the
fact that, 'plaintiff [Fleming] kept or offered to keep and to
perform all of the provisions of said agreement' the Defendants
'refused to permit Plaintiff to carry out his duties as general
manager...' and terminated his status as such, 'without any
reason or cause, provocation or excuse and [his duties] were
wrongfully transferred...to...Joseph H. Felt.'"
10

Fleming at 716.
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s t o c k o r t h e s t o c k of a n y s u b s i d i a r y w i t h i n o n e

condition

As

is

and e s c r o w a g r e e m e n t s , was t h e s a l e of

Helicopters,
s a l e of

to

it

the

court
did

not

a buyer

(R.

its

was

310).

application

trial

court's

fact.

B.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THE FLEMING RATIONALE
IS CONTROLLING IN THIS ACTION, THE SHARES OF
STOCK AWARDED TO MR. SMITH BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS DO NOT1 FIT WITHIN THE! APPROPRIATE
MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
Relying
Inc . ,

755

describes
place

the

contract

upon
P . 2d

the

Young
162,

measure

non-breaching
had

been

Elec.

164
of

Sign

(Utah

1988),

damages

party

in

performed."

Co. v .

as

as

the

"the

good

(Opinion
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United

Standard

Court
amount

of

Appeals

necessary

a position
P.5).

West

as

to

if

the

Thereafter

the

Court of Appeals appears simply to assume full performance under
the consulting agreement would have resulted
stock to Mr. Smith.

in return of the

The Court of Appeals1 assumption is not

justified by the findings of fact and conclusions of lawf or the
evidence introduced at trial.
In Fleming, the Supreme Court, after concluding a foundation
for excusing the Plaintiff's performance and awarding him damages
for breach of contract had been laid, considered the question of
just what damage

the Plaintiff

was entitled

to.

In its

discussion, it is evident the Supreme Court allowed those damages
for which there was adequate proof and disallowed damages for
which there was no proof.

Fleming at 716.

Clearly, it is the

Plaintiff's burden to prove the damages suffered as a result of
the breach.

In prevention of performance cases, the proof

required is proof that the condition on which the plaintiff's
rights depended would have occurred or been performed, but for
the prevention of performance.

Professor Corbin states:

One who sues for damages, alleging as a
breach the prevention or hindrance by the
other party must prove that the condition on
which his rights depended would have occurred
or been performed but for the prevention or
hindrance.^
if his performance would not
have been rendered anyway, he has not been
harmed by the alleged prevention or
-*• In support of his position, Professor Corbin relies upon
Cone v. Pedersen, 131 Conn. 374, 40 A.2d 274, 276 (1944). In
Cone, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut concluded that
although the defendant had obviously rendered impossible the
plaintiff's performance, the absence of a finding that the
plaintiff, a real estate broker, would have become entitled to
his commission before the listing contract terminated, justified
the trial court's refusal to award damages.
12

hindrance.
The existence of this
relation is a question of fact....

causal

4 Corbin on Contracts, Section 947, at 816 (1951).
the

proof

required

speculation.

Using

of

a

Plaintiff

a rather

must

appropriate

go

Furthermore,
beyond

analogy,

mere

Professor

Corbin states:
...[T]he number of fish that might have been
caught on a fishing tip is regarded as
speculative and uncertain; but nevertheless
there are cases in which profits may be
measured by the probable catch and a judgment
rendered therefor.
If the Plaintiff merely
testifies that but for the Defendant's breach
of duty he would have gone on the trip with
bait and fishing tackle, no sufficient basis
for inference is laid.
It will be otherwise
if he proves where he would have fished, his
skill as a fisherman, and the number of fish
caught by other fishermen in the same waters
under- like conditions.
5 Corbin on Contracts, Section 1022, at 140 (1964).
With the

foregoing

in mind

and, again

assuming

arguendo

Rocky Mountain prevented performance of the condition, we turn to
the proof presented

by Mr. Smith with respect to whether the

condition would have been

performed

but

for

Rocky

Mountain's

prevention.
At the time of trial, a substantial amount of evidence was
introduced with respect to negotiations with Offshore

Logistics

for the purchase of Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc.

In fact,

the trial court

found

intent was executed

that

on October

reflecting

the intent of Offshore Logistics

Inc. to purchase Rocky Mountain
Exhibit 9 ) .

18, 1983, a letter of

Helicopters, Inc.

The letter of intent was accepted

13

(R. 294 and

and ratified by

the Rocky Mountain Board of Directors at a meeting on November
15, 1983. (R. 294).

Thereafter, a draft of a sale contract for

the transfer of Rocky Mountain Helicopters1 assets was prepared.
However, the sale was never consummated because the parties could
not come to final terms.

Offshore Logistics reduced and changed

its initial offer of purchase prior

to finalization of the

drafted sales contract. (R. 294)
All discussions with Offshore Logistics Inc. occurred before
the consulting and escrow agreements were ever contemplated.
There were no discussions with any prospective purchaser after
entry of the agreements.

For that matter, there was no evidence

that discussions were entertained with anyone other than Offshore
Logistics.

Mr. Smith acknowledged he made no effort to sell, the

company after termination of the consulting agreement, because he
believed he would not be paid for his efforts.

(T. 128).

Does

Mr. Smith forget that if a sale or equity offering occurred he
stood to gain whatever his 11,945 shares were worth as outlined
in the escrow agreement?

Mr. Smith's only proof of efforts

subsequent to entry of the consulting agreement was that he was
"ready to perform," but "was never allowed to work."

(T.62)

That is, Mr. Smith simply put on proof that he "would have gone
on the trip with bait and fishing tackle."

At no time did he

prove "where he would have fished, his skill as a fisherman, and
the number of fish caught by other fishermen in the same waters
under like conditions."
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Not only did Mr. Smith fail to prove that the condition on
which his right to the stock depended

would have been

performed

but for Rocky Mountain's breach, but also, the proof introduced
by Mr. Smith at trial resulted in a finding that "[Mr. Smith] and
Burr, for and on behalf of the company, had not agreed upon any
specific

parameters

for

the

selling

specific parameters for additional
company."

(R. 310)

establish

the

company

infusion of capital

or

any

into the

The court went on to find "for the court to

such parameters would

would be even more

of

speculative

be highly
on the

speculative and it

part of the court

to

determine that [Mr. Smith] could have performed, given the chance
he believed he was prevented, by Burr, from having." (R. 310)
It is abundantly clear the trial court believed an award of
the 11,445 shares of stock to Mr. Smith, as part of his damages,
required speculation that, in the opinion of the trial court, was
unjustifiable.
speculation

The

trial court's

refusal

is well supported by the law.

to engage

in that

Even the most basic

legal periodicals make it clear:
.. .[Tlbe rule in both tort and contract
actions is that a recovery for lost profits
will be allowed only if their loss is capable
of being proved, and is proved, with a
reasonable degree of certainty.
No recovery
can be had for loss of profits which are
determined to be uncertain, contingent,
conjectural or speculative. Thus no recovery
can be had for loss of profits where it is
uncertain whether any profit at all would
have been made by the Plaintiff.
...[L]ost
profits will not be allowed as damages if the
trier of fact is required to speculate as to
the fact or amount of profits....
22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages, Section 625
15

(1988).

The transcript and

record are void of any proof that the condition on which Mr.
Smith's right to the stock depended would have been performed but
for Rocky Mountain's breach.

Because it was, in the opinion of

the trial court, uncertain whether the condition upon which Mr.
Smith's right to the stock depended could have been performed,
even if full performance under the contract occurred, no recovery
could or should be had.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IMPROPERLY
INVADES THE PROVINCE OF THE TRIAL COURT.
"It needs no citation of authorities that if there

is

substantial evidence to support the judgment of the court below,
[the Appellate Court] affirra[s]."

Leon Glazier and Sons, Inc. v.

Larsen, 26 Utah 2d 429, 491 P.2d 226, 227 (1971).

"In reviewing

the findings and judgment of the trial court, after trial on the
merits, [the Appellate] Court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party, and the judgment will be
affirmed where the findings of fact are substan t ia bed by the
evidence."
185, 187

Sharp v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 671 P.2d

(Utah 1983).

"The trial court's proximity to the

witnesses and its opportunity to hear their testimony and observe
their demeanor, places it in a far more advantaged position than
[the Appellate] Court, which must rely on an inanimate record."
Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985).

As a result,

the reviewing court, "will accord considerable deference to the
judgment of the trial court due to its advantaged position and
will not disturb the action of that court unless the evidence
16

c l e a r l y p r e p o n d e r a t e s t o t h e c o n t r a r y , or t h e t r i a l
its

discretion

Openshaw,

principles

court]

Utah 2d 2 9 3 , 323 P.2d 712, 716
its

wrongfully

law."

abuses

Openshaw v .

F i n a l l y , " t h e judgment

should be s u s t a i n e d

on any c o r r e c t l e g a l t h e o r y . "

In

of

639 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1 9 8 1 ) .

[of t h e t r i a l
it

or m i s a p p l i e s

court

if t h e f i n d i n g s

support

Fleming v . F l e m i n g - F e l t C o . , 7

(1958).

opinion,

the

Court

of

terminating

the

contract,

Appeals

asserts:

Rocky M o u n t a i n

"By

stripped

Smith of h i s a u t h o r i t y t o b a r g a i n on b e h a l f of t h e company and to
find

a buyer for

court

made

no

t h e company."
such

(Opinion P . 6 ) .

finding

of

fact

or

Since t h e

conclusion

a p p a r e n t l y t h e Court of Appeals r e l i e s upon Mr. S m i t h ' s
t h a t "he d i d not make f u r t h e r
he had no a u t h o r i t y
that

to a c t

Rocky M o u n t a i n

successful

efforts

not

and could not a f f o r d

of

Appeals s i m p l y

terminating

the

ignore

consulting

law,

testimony

t h e company,

compensate

him even

believed
if

he were

t o spend time on a p r o j e c t

had no p o s s i b i l i t y of r e m u n e r a t i o n . "
Court of

of

t o s e l l t h e company b e c a u s e

on b e h a l f

would

trial

Mr.

(Opinion P . 4 ) . ^
Burr's

agreement,

Does t h e

testimony

he was n o t

that

"that

in

terminating

S m i t h ' s a b i l i t y t o s e l l t h e company and t h a t he t o l d Smith he was
free

to

Opinion

continue
P.4).

to

try

to

Does t h e C o u r t

sell
of

the

company?"

Appeals

forget

(T.
that

190
a

and
still

v a l i d escrow agreement promised Mr. Smith compensation if he were
successful?

Does

the

Court

of

Appeals

ignore

Mr.

Smith's

4 The C o u r t of A p p e a l s g i v e s no i n d i c a t i o n a s t o what
p o r t i o n of t h e t r a n s c r i p t or r e c o r d i t r e l i e s upon a s s u p p o r t for
i t s conclusion.
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acknowledgement that the termination of the consulting agreement
did not prevent Mr. Smith from going to Jim Burr with an offer
from a buyer, nor did it prevent him from asking for financial
records, and the like, to present to a buyer?

(T. 127).

When reviewed in the light most favorable to Rocky Mountain
Helicopters (the party who prevailed in the trial court on the
issue of the disposition of 11,445 shares of stock), there is
little, if any, question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court's finding that Rocky Mountain's breach
did not prevent performance of the condition upon which Mr.
Smith's right to the stock depended.
Finally, the Supreme Court should note the briefs filed by
Mr. Smith do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court's findings.

Furthermore, the Court of

Appeals opinion is completely void of any indication that the
trial court abused its discretion.

Nevertheless, an order has

been entered reversing the trial court's decision with respect to
the disposition of 11,445 shares of stock.

Presumably, the Court

of Appeals has concluded the trial court misapplied the law to
the facts as found.

It should be apparent from the authorities

cited herein that the trial court decision
supported by the law.

is who Leheartedly

As a result, the Court of Appeals has

improperly invaded the province of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
It seems quite clear the Fleming rationale requires not just
a breach, but a breach that causes the non-performance of a
18

condition

or

promise,

excused.

In t h i s a c t i o n ,

termination

of

the

before

the

condition

no f i n d i n g

consulting

or promise may be

was made t h a t

agreement

the

caused

wrongful
the

performance of t h e c o n d i t i o n upon which Mr. S m i t h ' s r i g h t
stock depended.

Furthermore, the t r i a l

t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e c o n s u l t i n g
Smith from performing
stock

depended.

As

i n a p p l i c a b l e to t h i s
Assuming

a

result

arguendo

within

to

Flem i ng

Mr.

to

the

rationale

is

the

applicability

of

the

Flem i n g

a t t r i a l , t o prove t h e 11,445 s h a r e s

t h e a p p r o p r i a t e measure of damages.

time was any e v i d e n c e
entitled

found

action.

r a t i o n a l e , Mr. Smith f a i l e d ,
of s t o c k f i t

the

not p r e v e n t

upon which h i s r i g h t
the

to

court specifically

agreement did

the condition

non-

introduced that

the s t o c k ,

but

for

At no

Mr. Smith would have been

Rocky M o u n t a i n ' s b r e a c h .

upon Mr. S m i t h ' s e f f o r t s d u r i n g t h e two y e a r s p r e c e d i n g

Based

execution

of t h e c o n s u l t i n g a g r e e m e n t , t h e b e s t g u e s s a s t o t h e r e s u l t s of
his

efforts

during

the

one-year

period

agreement,

was t h a t

it

in a p u b l i c or p r i v a t e o f f e r i n g

engage

result,

with

damaged by t h e
court,

it

condition
would

the

consulting

Rocky Mountain would not be s o l d , nor would

respect

to

the

termination.

requires

of

11,445

h a v e been performed

given

as

noted

speculation

upon which Mr. S m i t h ' s r i g h t

its

stock.

As a

s h a r e s , Mr. Smith was not

At b e s t ,

substantial

of

to

the

to

by t h e

trial

conclude

stock

the

depended,

t h e o p p o r t u n i t y he b e l i e v e d

he

was d e n i e d .
F i n a l l y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s g i v e n a g r e a t d e a l of
19

discretion

in making findings of fact.
discount
trial

those findings on appeal, invades the province of

court.

reversing

To ignore or, in some other fashion,

Rocky

Mountain

respectfully

asserts

the trial court's order with respect

that

the
in

to the disputed

shares of stock, the Court of Appeals has improperly invaded the
province of the trial court.

Respectfully submitted this

/^

day of April, 1989.

/£k;/-^L

Robert S. Youngj /
Attorney for^Se^ition^r

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY AND MAILING
I hereby certify
correct

that

the original

copies of the above and

and 10

foregoing

(ten) true and

Petition

of Rocky

Mountain Helicopters, Inc. for Writ of Certiorari were filed with
the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court and 4 (four) true and correct
copies were furnished by mail to Suzanne Benson, Esq., Robert M.
McDonald, Esq., McDonald & Bullen, American

Plaza

III, 47 West

Second South, Suite 450, Salt Lake City, UT 84101 this
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Bf0

Richard S. Smith,
Plaintiff, Appellant
and Cross-Respondent,

OPINION
(Not For Publication)

v.

Rocky Mountain Helicoptersi
ins!*., a Utah corporation,
and Executive Escrow Services,
a Utah corporation,
Case No. 870511-CA

FILED

Defendants, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant.

FEB 8 1989
Fourth District, Utah County
The Honorable Boyd L. Park
Attorneys:

Robert M. McDonald, Suzanne Benson,
Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Robert S. Young, Provo, for Respondent

Before Judges Davidson, Garff and Greenwood.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Richard Smith initiated this action against Rocky
Mountain Helicopters, Inc., claiming that Rocky Mountain
improperly terminated his consulting contract. The trial courtfound that Rocky Mountain had improperly terminated the
contract, and awarded Smith 500 shares of stock, $600 in
gasoline benefits and $2,699.55 in medical and insurance
expenses. Smith appeals, asserting the trial court erred in
refusing to award him an additional 11,445 shares of stock.
Rocky Mountain cross-appeals, claiming the trial court erred in
finding that Rocky Mountain wrongfully terminated the contract,
and in awarding Smith $600 in gasoline benefits, $2,699.55
medical and insurance expenses, and 500 shares of stock.
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In January 1981, Smith entered into an oral employment
arrangement with Rocky Mountain, through its president, James
B. Burr. Under the arrangement, Smith became Rocky Mountain's
vice president of finance and was to receive a salary and a
bonus. Smith's responsibilities included dealing with the
problems Rocky Mountain was having with one of its creditors,
renegotiating Rocky Mountain's shareholder relationship, and
obtaining a buyer for Rocky Mountain. Smith successfully
restructured the company's financial position, refinanced the
creditor obligation, and reorganized the company's relationship
with its shareholders.
On September 20, 1982, Smith wrote a letter to Burr
confirming that 11,945 shares of the company's stock would be
issued to Smith if he completed a transaction whereby preferred
shareholders would give up their conversion rights. In the
letter, Smith stated that Rocky Mountain could recall the stock
if Smith resigned, was terminated with reasonable cause, died,
or left for other reasons. The letter also stated that if the
company were sold, or if the company had a successful public or
private offering, Rocky Mountain's option to recall the stock
would expire. On December 7, 1982, Smith was issued stock
certificate number 103 for 11,945 shares of stock. By letter
dated December 8, 1982, Smith reiterated the company's right to
recall the stock as set forth in the September 20, 1982
letter.
In late 1983, a rift arose between Smith and Burr. On
November 15, 1983, Rocky Mountain's board of directors passed a
resolution stating that in consideration of Smith's securing
releases from preferred shareholders, Smith was issued 11,445
shares of stock. The board of directors also passed a
resolution issuing 500 shares of stock to Smith and various
amounts of stock to other employees under the company's bonus
plan, in consideration of loyal service and performance. Stock
certificate number 103, which had been previously issued to
Smith one year earlier, included both the 500 shares and the
11,445 shares.
Also in 1983, Smith began negotiating the sale of Rocky
Mountain with Offshore Logistics. On November 21, 1983, after
the rift had arisen between Smith and Burr, Burr sent a
handwritten memorandum to Smith stating that Smith would no
longer be an officer of the company but would still have
authority to represent the company on specific assignments,
including acquisitions/mergers, corporate planning and
financing. In addition, the memo stated that Smith would be
more of a consultant and would be paid $250 per day, plus
expenses, with a minimum of eight days per month through
January 1984, at which time the program would be reevaluated.
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The memo also stated that Smith would receive full insurance
coverage under the company*s benefit schedule and one of the
company cars* Finally, the memo stated, "If the present sales
proposal [with Offshore Logistics] fails, you will be asked to
return your shares of stock Dec 31, 1983."
The sales proposal with Offshore Logistics failed. Smith
contended at trial that the sale failed because Burr told him
he had decided he did not want to sell the company. Burr,
however, testified that Offshore Logistics and Rocky Mountain
did not reach a final agreement. The court found that the sale
was never consummated because final terms were never agreed
upon and Offshore Logistics reduced and changed its initial
offer.
In February 1984, Burr and Smith agreed upon the terms of
a new consulting agreement, as set forth in a memo drafted by
Smith and signed by both. Under the agreement, Smith resigned
as vice president of finance of Rocky Mountain to pursue other
commitments. Smith agreed, however, to continue to provide
consulting services to Rocky Mountain, with the principal
assignment of attempting to sell the company or raise equity
capital. The consulting agreement provided that Smith would
receive $275 per day or $137.50 per half day for time spent
rendering services to the company* In addition, the agreement
stated that Rocky Mountain and Smith would target eight work
days a month, based on Smith's availability and the work
requirements of Rocky Mountain. As part of the agreement,
Smith agreed to place stock certificate number 103 for 11,945
shares in escrow. If the company sold or if Smith obtained
equity financing within one year, the stock would revert to
Smith. If no sale occurred, Rocky Mountain would be entitled
to the stock. The agreement also stated that Smith would
receive medical and dental insurance, continued life insurance,
$1,000 spousal travel and 50 gallons of gasoline per month.
Smith and Burr also signed an escrow agreement which contained
the same conditions as the consulting agreement with regard to
stock certificate number 103. The escrow agreement also stated
that it replaced the agreements of September 20 and December 8,
1982.
In April 1984, Rocky Mountain initiated an unrelated
lawsuit against Smith which was settled shortly after it was
filed. By letter dated April 23, 1984, Burr terminated the
consulting agreement, stating that the termination was because
of SmitlTs "lack of availability as a result of out-of-town
commitments." On February 15, 1985, Smith initiated this
action against Rocky Mountain for wrongful termination. From
February 15, 1984 to February 15, 1985, Rocky Mountain did not
sell any of its stock or assets or participate in a public or
private offering of its stock.
3

870511-CA
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At trial, Burr testified that the consulting agreement
was terminated due to Smith's unavailability. Burr stated that
he called Smith between five and ten times and was unable to
reach him. Burr also testified that in terminating the
consulting agreement, he was not terminating Smith's ability to
sell the company and that he told Smith he was free to continue
to try to sell the company. In contrast. Smith testified that
he was available and willing to work for Rocky Mountain and
that he would have received telephone messages if Burr had
attempted to contact him. He also stated that he did not make
further efforts to sell the company because he had no authority
to act on behalf of the company, believed that Rocky Mountain
would not compensate him even if he were successful, and could
not afford to spend time on a project which had no possibility
of remuneration.
With regard to the gasoline benefit, Smith's attorney
proffered that Smith was entitled to $600, but after
questioning Smith, revised the proffer to $400 or $450.
Smith's attorney also proffered that Smith expended $708.15 for
medical insurance, $1,111.40 for actual expenses and $850 for
dental care.
The court found that Smith's termination did not
completely frustrate and prevent him from finding a buyer for
the company within one year. The court concluded that the
consulting agreement was wrongfully terminated and that Smith
was entitled to $600 gasoline benefit and $2,699.55 for medical
and insurance expenses. The court also concluded that Smith
was entitled to the 500 shares of stock, because they were
issued as a bonus and were not, therefore, subject to the
recall provisions of the letter agreements or the consulting
and escrow agreements. The court found that Rocky Mountain was
entitled to return of the 11,445 shares of stock because the
company was not sold or the subject of a private or public
offering.
On appeal, Smith claims that the trial court's conclusion
that the contract was wrongfully terminated is inconsistent
with the court's finding that Rocky Mountain is entitled to the>
11,445 shares of stock. Rocky Mountain, however, claims that
the trial court's determination of wrongful termination is
incorrect as a matter of law because the contract was an
employment contract terminable at the will of either party.
Rocky Mountain also claims that even if the contract was not
terminable at will, the termination was for just cause, and
that the court erred in awarding Smith the 500 shares and in
the amounts of other damages awarded.
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The court's findings indicate that
agreement was coterminus with the escrow
after one year. In Bihlmaier v. Carson,
(Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held

the consulting
agreement/ both to end
603 P.2d 790, 792
that

in the absence of some further express or
implied stipulation as to the duration of
the employment or of a good consideration
in addition to the services contracted to
be rendered, the contract is no more than
an indefinite general hiring which is
terminable at the will of either party.
Since the contract in this case was to last for one year, it
had a specific duration, and thus, was not a terminable at will
contract.
The next issue raised is whether the trial court erred in
finding that Rocky Mountain wrongfully terminated the contract,
thus totally breaching the contract. In this case, the
contract explicitly stated that Smith would be free to perform
consulting work for other companies and that Smith and Rocky
Mountain would "target eight days a month of work [for Rocky
Mountain] based on [Smith's] availability concurrent with the
work requirements of [Rocky Mountain]." Smith's principal
assignment was to obtain a buyer for the company or equity
financing. Burr's letter to Smith terminating the consulting
contract effective May 1, 1984 stated that the termination was
because of Smith's unavailability. However, the contract
clearly anticipates that Smith's ability to perform work for
Rocky Mountain would be limited by his availability. In
addition, the nature of the work Smith agreed to perform under
the contract did not require a set amount of time each week or
month, and Smith testified that he was available to provide
consulting services. Therefore, because Rocky Mountain's
termination of the contract was for circumstances contemplated
by the contract and the court apparently believed Smith's
testimony as to his availability rather than Burr's, the
termination constituted a breach of the parties' contract•
We next consider whether Smith is entitled to retain the
11,445 shares of stock as part of his damages for breach of
contract. A substantial breach by one party, which prevents
the other party from performing, excuses the other party from
further performance and allows him to recover damages for the
breach. Fleming v. Flemino-Felt Co., 7 Utah 2d 293, 323 P.2d
712, 716 (1958). Generally, damages for breach of contract are
measured by the lost benefit of the bargain, "the amount
necessary to place the nonbreaching party in as good a position
as if the contract had been performed.- Young Elec. Sign Co.
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v- United Standard West, Inc.. 755 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988)
(quoting Alexander v. Brown. 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982)).
In this case, the parties1 consulting agreement provided
that Smith would place stock certificate number 103 for 11,945
shares of stock in escrow, on the condition that the stock
would be returned to Smith if the company were sold within one
year or if there were any negotiations ongoing for such a sale
at the end of the year which resulted in the sale of the
company. If no sale occurred, the stock would be returned to
the company.
By wrongfully terminating the contract, Rocky Mountain
stripped Smith of his authority to bargain on behalf of the
company and to find a buyer for the company. "In the case of a
bilateral contract for an agreed exchange of performances, a
repudiation of his duty by one of the parties terminates the
duty of the other," who may then sue for damages• 4 Corbin on
Contracts § 975, at 916 (4th ed. 1972). Therefore, Rocky
Mountain's termination of Smith excused Smith from performing
his obligations under the contract.1 Thus, Smith was
entitled to the 11,445 shares of stock to place him in the
position he would have occupied but for Rocky Mountain9s
breach. This conclusion likewise justifies retention of the
500 shares the court awarded to Smith.
Finally, we consider whether the trial court erred in
awarding Smith $600 in gasoline benefits and $2,966.55 in
medical benefits. An award of damages "must be supported by
proof upon which reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could
believe that it is more probable than not, that damage was
actually suffered." Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 559
P.2d 958, 961-62 (Utah 1977). At trial, Smith's attorney
proffered that Smith was entitled to $450 in gasoline benefits
after questioning Smith about his gasoline expenses. Because
the evidence does not support the court's award of $600, the
award of gasoline benefits must be revised to $450. In
addition, Smith1s attorney proffered that Smith expended
$708.15 for medical insurance, $1,111.40 in actual expenses and
1. The trial court found that Rocky Mountains termination of
Smith did not completely frustrate Smith's ability to sell the
company. However, as Smith testified, he no longer had the .
authority to negotiate on behalf of the company, and if he had
continued to search for a buyer, he would have had no guarantee
that he would be compensated. Therefore, while the trial
courtfs finding is presumed to be correct, it does not obviate
Smith1s right to damages because his failure to further perform
was excused by Rocky Mountain's breach.

870511-CA
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$850 in dental care. Those figures total $2,669.55 not
$2/966.55, the amount the trial court awarded. Therefore, the
medical benefits award must be revised to $2,669.55.
All other issues raised are without merit. Reversed and
remanded for entry of an order in accordance with this opinion,

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

JIWIW. G a r f f T J u d g e
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court herein be, and the same is, reversed and remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in
the opinion filed herein.
Opinion of the Court by PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge; RICHARD C.
DAVIDSON, and REGNAL W. GARFF, Judges, concur.
CERTIFICATE QF MAILINQ
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of February, 1989, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing OPINION was mailed or personally
delivered to each of the above parties.

fase Manager jy
TRIAL COURT:
£s
Fourth District Court, Utah County, #68775

29

iOS—

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Appendix E x h i b i t C

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

(tlase Number

RICHARD S. SMITH,

68775

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
EXECUTIVE ESCROW SERVICES, a
Utah corporation,
Defendant.
********

This matter came on duly and regularly before the court
sitting without a jury on the 11th day of March, 1987, beginning
at

9:00

a.m..

The

plaintiff

appeared

represented by Frederick A. Jackman, Esq..
Mountain
president

Helicopters,
and

Inc.

chairman

of

appeared
the

of

person

and

was

The defendant Rocky

through

Board

represented by Robert S. Young, Esq..

in

James

Directors

B.

Burr,

and

was

Defendant Executive Escrow

Services did not appear and was not represented by an attorney,
the parties stipulating that this defendant had no real interest
in the outcome of the law suit and was merely a holder of shares
of

stock

of

Rocky

Mountain

dispute as to ownership.

helicopters,

Inc. which

were

in

The court heard the evidence, received

Exhibits #1-16 and 20-28 and having heard the argument of counsel
and being fully advised in the premises, now finds and concludes
as follows:
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1.
Richard

In approximately January of 1981, the plaintiff,

S. Smith, was employed

by Rocky Mountain Helicopters,

Inc., (Herein sometimes referred to as the Company) through James
B. Burr, its president, to act in the capacity of vice president
of finance (Stipulated).
2.
to

Under the employment arrangement, the plaintiff was

receive

a

profitability,

salary

and

contingent

upon

the

a bonus equal to twenty percent

Company's

(20%) of that

salary (Stipulated).
3.

At

the

time

that

plaintiff

was

hired,

Rocky

Mountain Helicopters was experiencing difficulty with one of its
creditors, Teachers Insurance Annuity Fund; the company was also
attempting
preferred
buyer

to

renegotiate

the

shareholders; and

for the company.

relationship

it was

it

interested

had

with

its

in obtaining a

Plaintiff's responsibilities

included

dealing with these particular problems.
4.

Plaintiff was successful in his employment in the

following

areas:

position

by

suggested

by

the
the

(1)

Restructuring

adoption

of

the Company's

financial

accounting

procedures

certain

plaintiff;

(2)

Refinancing

the

Teachers

Insurance Fund obligation with a cash discount of approximately
seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars

($750,000.00) to the

Company;

arrangement with its

(3) Restructuring

the Company's

preferred shareholders at less cost to the Company and its common
shareholders

than had

alternatives

previously

securing

releases

from

theretofore

been provided

considered
the

by

preferred

2
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the

for

Company;

shareholders

in other
(4)

In

concerning

their rights of conversion and their right to elect the majority
of the board of directors because of certain defaults on the part
of the Company that were then in existence.
5.

Plaintiff submitted to Mr. Burr a memorandum dated

January 27, 1981, outlining plaintiff's accomplishments of the
past year for the Company.

Plaintiff further made the following

request:
"If I were to ask for, and receive, a cash bonus for
the contributions I have made to the Company of the
past year, there would be nothing to tie me to the
Company and to encourage further performance along the
same lines* Again, as I have indicated I am willing to
make a long term commitment to you and to the Company.
I would, therefore, like to propose an alternative to a
cash bonus.
I would like to suggest that from the
stock set aside for the conversion of the Preferred
Shares, or from other outstanding share that may be
coming back to Rocky Mountain Helicopters, that you
issue to me an amount equal to 10% of the outstanding
common shares. . ." (See Exhibit #2).
Plaintiff alleges Mr. Burr agreed to give him a cash bonus for
the work performed and accomplishments achieved as outlined in
Exhibit #2 and in paragraph 4 of this Memorandum Decision.

Mr.

Burr alleges he never agreed to give plaintiff a cash bonus for
his work and accomplishments, and further alleges the Company was
not

profitable

from

the

standpoint

of

the

cost

of

flying

helicopters was more than the income received.
6.

Plaintiff initially received seven thousand sixty-

six (7,066) shares which were obtained by the Company pursuant to
the redemption of stock from Gary Fitzgerald, which shares were
issued to him without any conditions.
7.

Plaintiff was issued 500 shares of the Company

under a stock bonus plan for loyal services and performance tc

3
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the Company.

Other key employees received stock in the Company

as a bonus as well.

The stock bonus was calculated on years of

service. (See Exhibit #6 and 23).
8.

Plaintiff was issued 11,945 shares of stock in the

Company (this included the 500 shares referred to in paragraph 7
above) for securing releases by the preferred
their stock conversion rights.

stockholders of

Such issue was in confirmation of

discussions and agreements in October 1982 with members of the
Board.

(See Exhibit #7 and 23). The said shares of the Company

were subject to recall by the Company as provided by letters of
understanding signed by the plaintiff dated September 20, 1982,
and December 8, 1982.
9.

(See Exhibit #3, 4, and 5).

A stock certificate No. 103 in the amount of eleven

thousand nine hundred and forty-five (11,945) shares was issued
to Richard S. Smith on or about December 7, 1982 (Stipulated).
10.
September

20,

The terms and conditions of the letters dated
1982,

and

December

8,

1982,

permitted

Rocky

Mountain Helicopters, Inc., to recall the stock at no cost if 1)
smith resigned as a director and employee of the company;

2)

Smith was terminated for reasonable cause; 3) Smith died; or 4)
Smith left the company for other reasons; unless prior to one of
those

events

Rocky

Mountain

Helicopters,

Inc.,

was

sold

or

participated in a successful public or private offering of its
common

stock.

If the Company was sold or participated

in a

successful public or private offering of its common stock then
the option to call the stock would expire.
Exhibits # 3 , 4 , and 5).

4

(Stipulated)

(See

11.

At

the time the disputed

shares were

issued,

plaintiff was fully aware of the terms and conditions governing
the issuance of the stock (particularly 11,449 shares), including
the right

to

recall the stock as outlined

in the letter of

September 20, 1982 (Stipulated).
12.

All of the transactions involving the issuance of

stock were approved by Rocky Mountain Helicopter, Inc.'s board of
directors at a board of directors meeting occurring on November
15, 1983 (Stipulated).
13.
Logistics
October

During 1983, Mr. Smith negotiated with offshore

for

of

the sale of Rocky Mountain

1983,

a letter

of

intent

for

helicopters
the sale

and

in

of Rocky

Mountain Helicopters to Offshore Logistics was negotiated, and
was accepted and ratified by the board of directors at a meeting
on November

15, 1983.

A draft

of a sale contract

transfer of Rocky Mountain Helicopters1

for

the

assets were prepared.

However, the sale was never consummated in that the final terms
of the agreement were never agreed to by the parties.

Offshore

Logistics, Inc. reduced and changed its initial offer of purchase
prior to finalization of the drafted sales contract.
14.

Towards the latter part of 1983, and as a result

of differences regarding corporate policy, a rift arose between
Mr. Burr and plaintiff (Stipulated).
15.

As a result of the major differences between the

plaintiff and Burr, plaintiff's position with the Company was
changed by Burr in a handwritten letter to plaintiff.
said handwritten letter, stated:

5

Burr, in

"If the present sale proposal
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fails, you will be asked to return your shares of stock December
31, 1983".

(See Exhibit #11). The sale proposal was to Offshore

Logistics.
16.

Plaintiff and the Company, through James Burr,

agreed to compromise their differences in which plaintiff would
be retained by Rocky Mountain Helicopters for a period of one
year under a consulting agreement with the principal assignment
of

plaintiff

to

sell

the

company

or

raise

equity

funding.

Plaintiff agreed to place his eleven thousand nine hundred and
forty-five (11,945) shares of stock (Certificate #103) in escrow.
This agreement was memorialized in a writing dated February 15,
1984,

which

consisted

of

a consulting

agreement

prepared

by

plaintiff and Mr. Burr and an escrow agreement prepared by Mr.
Burr's attorney, Jerry Thorn.

The actual date of signing of the

agreement was February 27, 1984. (See Exhibits # 13 and 14).
17.

In the consulting agreement, plaintiff promised to

be a consultant for Rocky Mountain helicopter and receive the
benefit of having the opportunity to continue his efforts either
to sell Rocky Mountain Helicopters or to arrange for an equity
injection

of funds

into Rocky Mountain Helicopters

public or private placement of stock.

through a

The contract provided that

for his consulting services he would receive consideration in the
amount of two hundred seventy-five dollars ($275.00) per day or
one hundred thirty-seven dollars and fifty cents
half

day

for

the

time

services to the Company.
having

the

continuation

plaintiff

spent

($137.50) per

rendering

consulting

Plaintiff was to receive the benefit of
of

the

fi

medical/dental

™

insurance.

Plaintiff was to receive the benefit of continued life insurance
and

associated

health

insurance.

Plaintiff

would

benefit of $1,000.00 spousal travel upon approval.

receive

the

Plaintiff was

to^receive the benefit of having his income tax returns prepared
for 1983.

Plaintiff was to receive the benefit of being able to

use the Xerox and Watts lines for personal use.
receive

the

Helicopters

benefit
to work

of

using

on his

the

other

office

Plaintiff was to

of

Rocky

activities.

The

Mountain
consulting

agreement provided for an exchange of accrued vacation, sick time
and separation
along with
agreement

benefits in return for an Oldsmobile

four new tires for the automobile.
provided

for

the

exchange

The consulting

of plaintiff's

from Windgate Oil Smith for a Suburban automobile.
to

receive

the benefit

of

fifty

(50) gallons

automobile

receivable

Plaintiff was

of gasoline

per

month.
18.

The Escrow Agreement

(dated February

27, 1984),

provides that if during the one (1) year period:
"ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTER, INC. is sold to a third
party or parties, either by virtue of a majority of its
assets being purchased or, in the alternative, any
public or private sale of its stock or the stock of any
subsidiary takes place, then and in that event, the
shares
of
stock
represented
by
the
certificates
deposited herewith will be returned to Richard S.
Smith? provided that if any negotiations for sale of
assets of stock have begun prior jto the expiration of
one (1) year from the date hereof that result in such a
sale, then and in that event, such sale will be
considered to have occurred within the one (1) year
previously mentioned herein.
Provided further that in
the event the conditions described herein do not occur
within one (1) year from the date of this Agreement
then .the stock represented by the Certificate No.
will be returned to ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTER, INC."
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The Escrow Agreement further stated it replaced the agreements of
September 20, 1982, and December 8, 198219.

At no time during

(See Exhibit #14).

the one year period

of the

Escrow Agreement did Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. sell any of
its stock or assets nor did

it participate

in any public or

private sale of its stock or the stock of any subsidiary.
20.
dated

Plaintiff confirmed

February

officer,

in the consulting agreement

15, 1984, his resignation

vice

president

—

finance,

and

as "chief

financial

treasurer

of

Rocky

Mountain Helicopters, Inc., as well as any other positions of
officership which I might hold with any subsidiary companies of
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc."

The resignation had effect

from January 1, 1984 (Stipulated).
21.

On or about March 2, 1984, the plaintiff resigned

as a director of Rocky Mountain helicopters, Inc. (Stipulated).
22.

Plaintiff's

testimony

language of the Escrow Agreement

and position

is that

the

(Exhibit #14) was intended to

eliminate the right of recall of plaintiff's stock, as provided
for

in the letter agreements of September

1982.

(Exhibits # 3 and 4).

20 and December

8,

That this change was discussed by

fhe*
4*fe plaintiff with attorney Jerry Thorn.
23.
Company

Burr's testimony and the position of defendant

is that the language of the Escrow Agreement

(Exhibit

#14) did not, nor was it ever intended, to eliminate the right of
recall

of

plaintiff's

stock

as

provided

for

agreements of September 20 and December 8, 1982.
and

4).

That

there

was

never
8

any
40

such

in

the

letter

(Exhibits # 3

discussion

between

plaintiff

and Burr, nor any such discussion between Burr and

attorney Jerry Thorn.
24.
plaintiff.
Based

On April 16, 1984, Rocky Mountain Helicopters sued

This law suit was settled on or about April 19, 1984.

on this law suite and other

factors, the relationship

between Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Jim Burr, and plaintiff was
left strained.
25.

Plaintiff's consulting agreement was terminated by

Burr for and in behalf of the Company on April 23, 1984.

(See

Exhibit #20).
26.
terminated

Burr contends plaintiff's consulting agreement was

because

of

plaintiff's

lack

of

availability.

Plaintiff did not perform any consulting services or render any
service at all for the company under the consulting agreement.
27.

Plaintiff contends his consulting agreement was

terminated because of the settlement of the lawsuit referred to
is paragraph #24 herein and further to preclude plaintiff from
trying to either sell the Company or add additional equity to the
Company.
28.

Plaintiff

and Burr

for and

on behalf

of the

Company, had not agreed upon any specific parameters for the
selling of the Company or * M > specific parameters for additional
infusion of capital into the Company.

F6r the court to establish

such parameters would be highly speculative and it would be even
more speculative on the part of the court to determine that
plaintiff could have performed, given the chance he believe he
was prevented by Burr from having.

9
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29.

The court does not find that the plaintiff was

completely frustrated and prevented from finding a buyer for the
company within the one (1) year time period by Burr.
Based on the foregoing the court concludes as follows:
1.
terminated

Plaintiff's

consulting

agreement

as it relates to the following

was wrongfully

items, and as such

plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the defendant Company
as follows:

the

a.

$600.00 for a gasoline benefit.

b.

$2,699.55 for medical and insurance expenses of

plaintiff

incurred

during

the

term

of

the

consulting

agreement.
2.

Plaintiff is not entitled to any compensation for

work days, inasmuch as he did not work, nor was there an absolute
provision providing a minimum of work days.

Defendant Company

could have provided as many as eight days a month or no days a
month.
3.
9,445

shares

Defendant Company
of

Company

stock,

is entitled
inasmuch

to the return of
as

the

Consulting

Agreement and the Escrow Agreement provided for the return of
stock

in the event the Company was not sold or a public or

private sale of equity was not effected.

The Company was not

sold nor was there a public or private sale of equity.

To

believe the plaintiff could have sold the Company or effected a
public or private sale of equity within one year, when there was
no agreement as to the terms of either would be speculative.

10
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4.

Plaintiff
issued

to

is entitled
him

as

to own

a

bonus.

the

500

Since

shares of

Company

stock

the

Company

elected

to issue such shares as a stock bonus, such shares so

issued should not be a part of the stock issued under the call
provisions

of

the

letter

agreements

or

the provisions

of

the

consulting agreement and the escrow agreement•
5.

Counsel for the defendant

is directed

to prepare

and serve pursuant to Rule 2.9 appropriate Findings, Conclusions
and Order in accordance with the foregoing.
DATED at Provo, Utah, this

/ 3 ^ d a y of May, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

^BCYD

cc:

X.

Frederick A. Jackman, Esq.
Robert S. Young, Esq.
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PARK, JUDGE

Appendix Exhibit B
ROBERT S. YOUNG
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC.
Post Office Box 1337
Provo, UT 84603
801-375-1124
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD S. SMITH,

)

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

)
)
)

ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
EXECUTIVE ESCROW SERVICES, a
Utah corporation,

)
)
)
)

Civil No. 685775

Defendants.

)

Trial of this matter occurred on the 11th day of May, 1987,
commencing at 9:00 AM.

The Plaintiff appeared in person and was

represented by Frederick A. Jackman, Esq.

The Defendant, ROCKY

MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., appeared through James B. Burr,
President and Chairman of the Board of Directors, and
represented by Robert S. Young, Esq.

was

Defendant, EXECUTIVE ESCROW

SERVICES, did not appear and was not represented by an attorney,
the other parties stipulating that said Defendant had no real
interest in the outcome of the lawsuit and was merely a holder of
shares of stock of ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC. which were in
dispute as to ownership.
The Court having heard

the evidence, received exhibits

numbered 1 (one) through 16 (sixteen) apd 20 (twenty) through 28
-145

(twenty-eight) , heard the argument of counsel and being otherwise
fully advised in the premises hereby enters these:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In approximately

January of 1981f the Plaintiff,

RICHARD S. SMITH, was employed by ROCKY MOUNTAIN

HELICOPTERS,

INC., (herein sometimes referred to as the Company), through
James B. Burr, its President, to act in the capacity of Vice
President of Finance.
2.

(Stipulated)

Under the employment arrangement, the Plaintiff was to

receive a salary and contingent upon the Company's profitability,
a bonus equal to 20% of that salary.
3.

At

the

time

Plaintiff

(Stipulated)
was hired,

ROCKY MOUNTAIN

HELICOPTERS, INC. was experiencing difficulty with one of its
creditors, Teachers
attempting
preferred

Annuity

to renegotiate

Fund.

The Company

the relationship

was also

it had with

its

shareholders and was interested in obtaining a buyer

for the Company.

Plaintiff's responsibilities included, .-among-

--oUlUl' tilings, dealing with these particular problems.
4.

Plaintiff was successful

in his employment

in the

following areas:
a*

Restructuring the Company's financial position by

the adoption of certain accounting procedures suggested by
the Plaintiff;
b.

Refinancing the Teachers Insurance Fund obligation

with a cash discount of approximately

$750,000.00

hundred fifty thousand dollars) to the Company;
-246

(seven

c.

Restructuring

the Company's arrangement

with

preferred shareholders at less cost to the Company apd its
common shareholders th9n had theretofore been available in
other alternatives previously considered by the Company; and
d.

Securing releases from the preferred shareholders

concerning their rights of conversion and their right to
elect a majority of the Board of Directors due to certain
defaults on the part of the Company

that were then in

existence,
5.

Plaintiff submitted to Burr, in the early part of 1982r

a memorandum

dated January 27, 1981, outlining

accomplishments

Plaintiff's

of the past year for the Company.

In the

memorandum, Plaintiff made the following request:
"If I were to ask for, and receive, a cash
bonus for the contributions I have made to
the Company of the past year, there would
be nothing to tie me to the Company and to
encourage further performance along the same
lines. Again, as I have indicated I am
willing to make a long term commitment to you
and to the Company. I would, therefore, like
to propose an alternative to a cash bonus. I
would like to suggest that from the stock set
aside for the conversion of the preferred
shares, or from other outstanding shares that
may be coming back to Rocky Mountain Helicopters, that you issue to me an amount equal
to ten percent of the outstanding common
shares...." (See Exhibit 2)
Plaintiff alleges Mr. Burr agreed to give him a cash bonus
for the work performed and accomplishments achieved as outlined
in Exhibit 2 and paragraph 4 of these Findings.

Mr. Burr alleges

he never agreed to give Plaintiff a cash bonus for his work and
-347

accomplishments, M m

in
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^xiec ompliahiwaiLji , and furthermore, the Company was not profitable
from the standpoint of its helicopter operations.

The cost of

flying the helicopters was exceeding the income received*
6.

Plaintiff

initially received 7,066

sixty-six) shares of stock in the Company.

(seven thousand

The stock had been

returned by Gary Fitzgerald and was issued to Plaintiff without
conditions.
7.
Company

Plaintiff was issued 500 (five hundred) shares of the
under

a stock bonus

performance to the Company.

plan

for

loyal

services

and

Other key employees received stock

in the Company under the same terms and conditions.

The number

of shares issued was calculated based upon years of service to
the Company.
8.

(See Exhibits 6 and 23)

Plaintiff was issued

11,945

(eleven

thousand

nine

hundred forty-five) shares of stock in the Company (including the
500 (five hundred) shares referred to in paragraph 7 above) for
securing releases by the preferred shareholders of their stock
conversion rights.

The foregoing issue was made in confirmation

of discussions and agreements in October 1982 with members of the
Board.

(See Exhibits 7 and 23)

The said shares of the Company

were subject to recall by the Company as provided in letters of
understanding signed by the Plaintiff dated September 20, 1982
and December 8, 1982 (see Exhibits 3, 4, and 5).
9.

Stock certificate number 103 in the amount of 11,945

(eleven thousand nine hundred forty-five shares) was issued to
-448

RICHARD S. SMITH on or about December 7, 1982.
10.

(Stipulated)

The terms and conditions of the letters dated

September 20, 1982 and December 8, 1982, permitted ROCKY MOUNTAIN
HELICOPTERS, INC*, to recall the stock represented by certificate
number 103, at no cost if:

(1) SMITH resigned as a director and

employee of the Company; (2) SMITH was terminated for reasonable
cause; (3) SMITH died; or (4) SMITH left the Company for other
reasons; unless prior to one of those events ROCKY MOUNTAIN
HELICOPTERS, INC. was sold or participated in a successful public
or private offering of its common stock.

If the Company was sold

or participated in a successful public or private offering of its
common stock, then the option to call the stock would expire.
(Stipulated - see Exhibits 3, 4, and 5)
11.

At the time the disputed shares were issued, Plaintiff

was fully aware of the terms and conditions governing

the

issuance of the stock (particularly 11,445 (eleven thousand four
hundred forty-five) shares), including the right to recall the
stock

as outlined

in the

letter

of

Seotember

20, 1982.

(Stipulated)
12.

All of the transactions involving the issuance of stock

were approved by the Board of Directors of ROCKY

MOUNTAIN

HELICOPTERS, INC. at a Board of Directors meeting occurring on
November 15, 1983.
13.

During

(Stipulated)
1983, Mr. SMITH

negotiated

Logistics for the sale of ROCKY MOUNTAIN

with

Offshore

HELICOPTERS and in

October of 1983, a letter of intent for the sale of ROCKY
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MOUNTAIN

HELICOPTERS to Offshore Logistics was negotiated.

The

transaction was accepted and ratified by the Board of Directors
at a meeting on November
for

the

transfer

prepared.

of

15, 1983.

ROCKY

A draft of a sale contract

MOUNTAIN

HELICOPTERS'

assets

was

However, the sale was never consummated, in that the

final terms of the agreement were never agreed to by the parties.
Offshore Logistics, Inc. reduced and changed its initial offer to
purchase prior to finalization of the drafted sales contract.
14.

Towards

the

latter

part of 1983, and as a result of

differences regarding corporate policy, a rift arose between Mr.
Burr and Plaintiff.
15.

As

(Stipulated)

a result

of

the major

differences

between

the

Plaintiff and Mr. Burr, Plaintiff's position with the Company was
changed by Mr. Burr in a hand-written letter to Plaintiff.
letter stated:
asked

"If the present sale proposal fails, you will be

to return your shares of stock December

Exhibit 11)

The

31, 1983."

(See

The sale proposal to which reference is made in the

hand-written letter is that sale proposal to Offshore Logistics.
'^hf

^6#

T4m

Plaintiff
4LOOO1VO

and

uluih—Mas

not

ratTriiimJ by Dtfi'tfmbtfr 31, 1003 and

the Company, through

James B. Burr, agreed

to

their differences by placing stock certificate number 103

in escrow for a period of 1 (one) year and, during that period,
Plaintiff

would

be

retained

by

the Company,

pursuant

to a

Consulting Agreement, with the principal assignment of attempting
to sell the Company or raise equity funding.

This agreement was

memorialized in a writing dated February 15, 1984 which consisted
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of a Consulting Agreement prepared by Plaintiff and Mr. Burr and
an Escrow Agreement prepared by Mr. Burr's attorney, Jerry Thorn.
The actual date of signing of the Escrow Agreement was February
27, 1984.
17.

(See Exhibits 13 and 14)
Under the Consulting Agreement, Plaintiff promised to

be a consultant for ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, to continue his
efforts either to sell ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS or to arrange
for an equity injection of funds into ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS
through a public or private placement

of stock, and was to

receive consideration for such services in|the amount of $275.00
(two hundred

seventy-five dollars) per day or $137.50

(one

hundred thirty-seven dollars and fifty cents) per half day for
the time Plaintiff spent rendering such services to the Company.
As additional consideration Plaintiff was to receive medical and
dental insurance, continued life insurance and associated health
insurance, and $1,000 (one thousand dollars) spousal travel upon
approval.

In addition, Plaintiff was to receive the benefit of

having his income tax returns prepared for 1983, the use of Xerox
and Watts lines for personal use, and an office at ROCKY MOUNTAIN
HELICOPTERS to work on his other activities.
provided

The agreement

for an exchange of accrued vacation, sick time and

separation benefits in return for an Oldsmobile automobile,
including 4 (four) new tires.

The agreement further provided for

the exchange of Plaintiff1s receivable from Windgate Oil for a
Suburban automobile.

Finally, Plaintiff was to receive 50

(fifty) gallons of gasoline per month.
-751

18.

The Escrow Agreement (dated February 27, 1984) provides

that if, during the 1 (one) year period:
"ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTER, INC. is sold to
a third party or parties, either by virtue
of a majority of its assets being purchased
or, in the alternative, any public or private
sale of its stock or the stock of any subsidiary takes place, then and in that event,
the shares of stock represented by the
certificates deposited herewith will be
returned to Richard S. Smith; provided that
if any negotiations for sale of assets of
stock have begun prior to the expiration of
one (1) year from the date hereof that result
in such a sale, then and in that event, such
sale will be considered to have occurred within
the one (1) year previously mentioned herein.
Provided further that in the event that conditions described herein do not occur within
one (1) year from the date of this Agreement,
then the stock represented by the certificate
No.
will be returned to ROCKY MOUNTAIN
HELICOPTER, INC."
The Escrow

Agreement

further

stated

it replaced

the

8, 1982.

(See

agreements of September 20, 1982 and December
Exhibit 14)
19.

At no time during the one (1) year period of the Escrow

Agreement did ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC. sell any of its
stock or assets nor did it participate in any public or private
sale of its stock or the stock of any subsidiary.
20.

Plaintiff confirmed

in the Consulting Agreement of

February 15, 1984, his resignation as "Chief Financial Officer,
Vice

President — Finance, and

Treasurer

of ROCKY MOUNTAIN

HELICOPTERS, INC., as well as any other positions of officership
which

I might

hold with any subsidiary companies

MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC."

of ROCKY

The resignation had effect from
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January 1, 1984.
21.

(Stipulated)

On or about March 2, 1984, Plaintiff

Director of ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC.
22.

resigned as a

(Stipulated)

Plaintiff's testimony and position is that the language

of the Escrow Agreement

(Exhibit 14) was intended to eliminate

the right of recall of Plaintiff's stock as provided

in the

letter agreements of September 20, 1982 and December 8, 1982.
(Exhibits 3 and 4)

Plaintiff further contends that this change

was discussed by the Plaintiff with attorney Jerry Thorn.
23.

Burr's testimony and the position of Defendant Company

is that the language of the Escrow Agreement

(Exhibit 14) did

not, nor was it ever intended to, eliminate the right to recall
Plaintiff's stock as provided
September

in the letter

20, 1982 and December

8, 198|2.

agreements

of

(Exhibits 3 and 4)

Furthermore, it is the position of Defendant Company, and Mr.
Burr testified, that there was never any discussion regarding the
elimination of the right of recall, between Plaintiff and Burr,
or between Burr and attorney Jerry Thorn.
24.

On April 16, 1984, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, sued the

Plaintiff on a matter unrelated to this lawsuit.
settled on or about April 19, 1984.
other

factors, the

relationship

That action was

Based on that lawsuit and
between

ROCKY

MOUNTAIN

HELICOPTERS, Jim Burr, and Plaintiff was left strained.
25.

Plaintiff's Consulting Agreement was terminated by Mr.

Burr for and in behalf of the Company on April 23, 1984 •
Exhibit 20)
-95

^

(See

26.

Burr

contends

Plaintiff's

Consulting

Agreement

was

Agreement

was

terminated due to Plaintiff's lack of availability*
27.

Plaintiff

contends

the

Consulting

terminated as part of Defendant's reaction to the settlement of
the lawsuit referred to in Finding number 24 above and further to
preclude Plaintiff from trying to either sell or add

additional

equity to the Company.
28.

Plaintiff

did

not perform any consulting

render any service at all for the Company

services or

under the Consulting

Agreement.
29.

Plaintiff and Burr, for and on behalf of the Company,

had not agreed upon any specific parameters

for the selling

of

the Company or any specific parameters for additional infusion of
capital

into

the Company.

For

the Court

to establish

such

parameters would be highly speculative and it would be even more
speculative on the part of the Court to determine that
could

have

performed,

given

the

chance

be

Plaintiff

believed

he

was

prevented, by Burr, from having.
30.

The Court

finds that Plaintiff's termination by Burr,

did not completely frustrate and prevent Plaintiff from finding a
buyer for the Company within the 1 (one) year time period.
Based upon the foregoing

Findings of Fact the Court hereby

enters these:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Consulting

it relates

to the

Agreement was wrongfully terminated

following

items, and
-1054

as such

Plaintiff

as
is

entitled to a judgment against the Defendant Company as follows:
A.

$600 (six hundred dollars) for a gasoline benefit;

B.

$2,699.55

(two thousand

six hundred ninety-nine

dollars and fifty-five cents) for medical and insurance expenses
of the Plaintiff

incurred during the term of the Consulting

Agreement.
2.

Plaintiff's

claim for compensation

for consulting

services is without any legal basis inasmuch as he did not work,
nor was there any absolute provision providing a minimum of work
days.

Defendant Company could have provided as many as 8 (eight)

work days a month or as few as no work days a month.
3.

Defendant Company is entitled to the return of 11,445

(eleven thousand four hundred forty-five) shares of stock issued
to Plaintiff, inasmuch as the Consulting Agreement and the Escrow
Agreement provided for the return of stock in the event that the
Company was not sold or a public or private sale of equity was
not effected.

The Company was not sold nor was there a public or

private sale of equity.

To believe the Plaintiff could have sold

the Company or effected a public or private sale of equity within
1 (one) year, when there was no agreement as to the terms of
either would be speculative.
4.

Plaintiff

is entitled to own the 500 (five hundred)

shares of Company stock issued to him as a bonus in connection
with years of service rendered.

Since the Company elected to

issue such shares as a stock bonus, such shares so issued should
not be a part of the stock issued under the call provisions of
-1155

the

letter

agreements

or

the p r o v i s i o n s

of

the

Consulting

Agreement and the Escrow Agreement.
Dated t h i s

JZ?

day of

L>^v,^

, 1987.

>yd L. Park, Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby c e r t i f y
and

foregoing

that a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of

Findings

furnished by mail t o :

of

Fact

and C o n c l u s i o n s

of

the above
Law was

Frederick A. Jackman, Esq. 1327 South 800

E a s t , S u i t e 300, Orem, UT 84058 t h i s

$Q

da

1987.

Mollie Ungricht
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Appendix Exhibit E
ROBERT S. YOUNG
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC.
Post Office Box 1337
Provo, UT 84603
801-375-1124
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD S. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
ORDER OF JUDGMENT
vs.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
EXECUTIVE ESCROW SERVICES, a
Utah corporation.

Civil No. 68^775

Defendants.
Trial of this matter occurred on the 11th day of March,
1987, commencing

at 9:00 AM.

The Court, having entered its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby:
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES
1.

Judgment

is hereby entered against Defendant, ROCKY

MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., and in favor of Plaintiff for the sum
of $3,299.55 (three thousand two hundred ninety-nine dollars and
fifty-five cents) as compensation

to Plaintiff for loss of

gasoline benefits and medical and insurance expenses to which
Plaintiff was entitled under the Consulting Agreement of February
15, 1984.
2.

Defendant, EXECUTIVE ESCROW SERVICES, is ordered to

return to Defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., stock
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certificate number 103, issued to Plaintiff, and representing
11,945 (eleven thousand nine hundred forty-five) shares of stock
in Defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC.

Said certificate

may be cancelled by Defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC.,
and the shares represented thereby returned to said Defendant.
3.

Defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., is hereby

ordered to issue to Plaintiff a new stock certificate reflecting
the ownership by Plaintiff of 500 (five hundred) shares of the
common

stock of Defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC.

Plaintiff is entitled to the foregoing shares as a result of the
stock bonus issued to various employees based upon years of
service rendered.
Dated this ,c^£?

day o f ^ ^y^^\Jt^

, 1987.

Boyd L. Park, Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that the above and foregoing Order of
Judgment was furnished by mail to Frederick A. Jackman, Esq.,
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300, Orem, UT 84058 thii s

Jo

, 1987.

(

t. lhmrJt
Mdllie Ungricht

-258
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day of

DESIGNATION OF CASE AND PARTIES
AS THEY APPEARED IN THE TRIAL COURT

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD S. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 68775

vs.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
EXECUTIVE ESCROW SERVICES, a
Utah corporation,
Defendants.
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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
AS THEY APPEARED IN COURT OF APPEALS

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD S. SMITHf
Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Respondent
Court of Appeals

vs.

No.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS,
INC., a Utah corporation,

870511-CA

Supreme Court
No. 870265

Defendant, Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant

Priority No. 14b

and EXECUTIVE ESCROW SERVICES, a
Utah corporation,
Defendant.
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